I don’t normally include letters to the editor but this is a
great opportunity to provide some links to early U.S. government documents.
The Federalist Papers
“It was equally desirable, that the
immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the
qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to
deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements
which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected
by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess
the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations…. It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as
possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the
election of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency in the
administration of the government as the President of the United States. But the
precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under
consideration, promise an effectual security against this mischief. The choice
of SEVERAL, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to
convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the
choice of ONE who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes. And
as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in
which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them
much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the
people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.”
“The latent causes of faction are thus
sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different
degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society.
A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and
many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to
different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to
persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human
passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with
mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each
other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of
mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion
presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been
sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent
conflicts….. By
what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the
existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must
be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must
be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry
into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be
suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can
be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the
injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to
the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes
needful.”
